Hedge funds are considered to be market-neutral due to their unrestricted investment flexibility and more efficient market timing abilities (Ennis & Sebastian, 2003) . They may also be considered as suitably unconventional assets for improving portfolio diversification (Lamm, 1999) . The evidence from this study confirms the dominance of hedge funds over the CAC 40, DAX, S&P 500 and Dow Jones from 2004 to 2011. Overall, the Sharpe, Sortino, Omega, Jensen's 
INTRODUCTION
edge funds are defined as pooled investment vehicles that embody a variation of different investment strategies, which can include short and long positions, leveraged positions, and derivate positions to limit market exposure and to increase risk-adjusted returns (Amin & Kat, 2003; National Treasury, 2012) . With no investment constraints, a hedge fund manager is capable of investing in any global market to maximise a fund's financial gains (Kanellakos, 2005) . This implies that the different investment strategies available can satisfy a variation of investors with different risk preferences (Shin, 2012) . As such, hedge funds are considered unconventional assets that contribute to a higher reward level, which can serve as a substitute for cash and bonds during a declining equity market (Lamm, 1999) .
However, the certainty of performance persistence has been diluted by the many conflicting results found by past studies. On the one hand the proponents of hedge funds argue that their low correlation with the returns on traditional alternative assets, like currencies, bonds, mutual funds and other equities, therefore, make them a better risk-return trade-off vehicle (Fung & Hsieh, 1997; Lavino, 2000; Amin & Kat, 2003; Al-Sharkas, 2005) . This low correlation with the rest of the asset universe is further enhanced because of their exemption from the Company Act of 1940 and from the Security Exchange Act of 1934, providing them greater flexibility regarding different investment options.
It is also argued that hedge funds generate positive alphas, which implies that hedge fund managers as a group have an investment ability and may possess private information that is unavailable to other investors (Li, 2006) , thus emphasising the potential dominance of hedge funds. Also, with the possibility of implementing features, like lock up periods, redemption frequencies and notices, share restrictions and minimum investment
RISK-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES
The Sharpe ratio remains one of the most commonly used statistics in financial analysis. It is, therefore, not surprising that market participants -whether investors or fund managers -still employ the Sharpe ratio as the performance measure of choice (see for example Lo Treynor ratio (1) where denotes the return of a portfolio or security; denotes the risk-free rate; and is utilised as risk metric, thus incorporating market risk. Sharpe's ratio veers away from market risk, only considering the volatility of the portfolio around its own mean as a risk measure. The Sharpe ratio can thus be expressed as (adapted from Sharpe, 1966 ) : Sharpe ratio (2) where is the standard deviation of portfolio returns. Sharpe's ratio thus allows for the measurement of the risk premium of the portfolio, for every unit of risk assumed. Therefore, it is obvious that, like with Treynor's ratio, the portfolio with the greater Sharpe value will be the best performing portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis. However, although these two measures are so alike, they do not always render similar results. It is thus possible for a portfolio with a relatively large unique risk to outperform the market when looking at the Treynor's ratio, but underperform the market when using Sharpe's ratio (Deb, 2012) .
Despite the Sharpe ratio's popularity, there are still some pitfalls to consider when applying it as performance measure in cases where its underlying assumptions are breached (Auer & Schuhmacher, 2013 , p. 154; Schuster & Auer, 2012, p. 124 ). As such the Sharpe ratio generally fares better in ranking the performance of less volatile returns (such as that of mutual funds), but poorer when highly volatile returns are gauged (Lo, 2002, p. 36) . Since hedge funds make use of derivative instruments, their returns often follow an asymmetrical distribution with fat tails (thus a non-normal distribution), thus reducing the Sharpe ratio's ability to handle these returns (Fung & Hsieh, 1999a; Eling, 2008) . In such circumstances, the Sharpe ratio tends to overestimate true risk (Brooks & Kat, 2002) . This leaves market participants, with a skewed perception of the real risk inherent in hedge funds.
It is, therefore, necessary to look wider than the standard Sharpe ratio when comparing hedge fund performance with anything. To this end, several studies have included a variety of measures to gauge the performance of hedge funds. Gregoriou and Rouah (2002) , for example employed both the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor ratio while Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) used the Sharpe ratio and Jensen's alpha. In their paper on the influence of different performance measures on the evaluation of hedge funds, Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) employed thirteen different performance measures, and reported that the rankings according to the Sharpe ratio and the other performance measures were very similar. 1 Eling (2008) also went on to test the performance rankings of a wider population of asset classes including stocks, bonds, real estate, hedge funds, funds of hedge funds, Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) and Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) by employing eleven performance measures including the Sharpe ratio. 2 Moreover, there have also been studies, like Sedzro (2009) , who have consulted not only the Sharpe ratio and Modified Sharpe ratio, but have used additional statistical models, like the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method and the Stochastic Dominance (SD) method, to generate performance rankings.
In order to measure the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on hedge funds a combination of ratios used by Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) , Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) , as well as Gregoriou and Rouah (2002) were chosen. These ratios were selected to rank the sample of hedge fund and market index returns in order to escape some of the shortcomings of using only Sharpe in modelling volatile returns. Also, to extent the risk perception and the shortcomings of the Sharpe and Treynor ratio additional ratios were also employed.
Measures other than Sharpe and Treynor
Where Treynor and Sharpe's indexes provide measures for ranking the relative performances of various portfolios on a risk-adjusted basis, Jensen (1968) attempted to construct a measure of absolute performance on a risk-adjusted basis, i.e., a definite standard against which performances of various portfolios can be measured. This standard is based on measuring the 'portfolio manager's predictive ability' (the ability to earn returns through successful prediction of security prices), which are higher than those expected, given the level of riskiness of his portfolio, the expectation being based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This is an attempt to determine if returns, more than that expected based on CAPM, are being earned for the portfolio's riskiness. A simplified version of his basic model is given by (adapted from Jensen, 1968) :
where is the average portfolio return for the period concerned; is the risk-free rate for the same period; is the average market return or the return of the index for the portfolio concerned for the same period; and is the Jensen's Alpha.
The based on CAPM, on average, should be zero in the long-run, indicating neutral performance by a portfolio, i.e., the portfolio has done just as well as an unmanaged market portfolio or a large, randomly selected portfolio manager with a naive buy-and-hold strategy. A positive value of represents a superior performance on the part of the portfolio manager. On the other hand, a negative value of indicates inferior management performance, because management did not do as well as an unmanaged portfolio of equal systematic risk.
The Sortino ratio differs from Sharpe in another way: it applies downside deviation as denominator instead of overall standard deviation. It, therefore, only considers "bad" volatility (Sortino & Sortino ratio (4) where is the risk free rate and the Lower Partial Moment (LPM) can be written as:
The Sortino ratio's ability to capture downside risk lays in the fact that it uses a LPM of the second order (thus ) to capture the semi-variance of returns. Since LPMs only consider negative deviations from a minimal acceptable return (normally a risk free rate), it trumps standard deviation that captures both positive and negative deviations of expected returns. The other ratio used that employs LPMs is Omega.
Omega does not only capture LPMs, but also Higher Partial Moments (HPMs), thus taking the positive deviations of expected returns above a minimal acceptable returns into consideration. In doing this, Omega provides a risk-reward evaluation that incorporates both the beneficial impact of gains and the unfavourable effect of losses, relative to any investor's threshold (Shadwick & Keating, 2002) Omega (6) where the LPM can once again be written as: (7) In this case the LPM of the order is observed. It should be clear from Equation 6 that Omega allows the user to specify the level of return against which a given outcome will be considered a profit or a loss, and is thus in essence a probability weighted ratio of profits to losses relative to a return threshold (Bertrand & Prigent, 2011) .
The other measure employed that uses LPMs in the form of a maximum drawdown is the Calmar ratio. This ratio allows the user to express excess returns as a function of the maximum cumulative loss between a peak and a following bottom. The Calmar ratio can, therefore, be easily expressed as follows (adapted from Eling, 2008):
Calmar ratio (8) where is the average portfolio return for the period concerned; is the risk-free rate for the same period, and is the maximum drawdown. Although Magdon-Ismail and Atiya (2004) cautions against the use of the Calmar ratio in the form above, this issue is not applicable in our case since all comparisons are done over the same time frames. 3 The final performance measure to be used is the EWMA model of JP Morgan. This model can provide substantial assistance in portfolio allocation and performance, even outperforming multivariate Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models (Giamouridis & Vrontos, 2007) . This model can be illustrated as follows (J.P. Morgan/Reuters, 1996): (9) where the EWMA model depends on the decay factor, , which determines the relative weights that must be applied to returns. In estimating the decay factor the following steps must be followed (J.P. Morgan/Reuters, 1996): Firstly, must be calculated. This can be achieved by taking the sum of all minimal Root-Mean-SquareErrors (RMSE), 's: (10) where MSE Then, the relative error measure must be defined as follows:
(11) The Clute Institute Once the relative error measure is defined, the weight should be defined as follows: (12) where Finally, the optimal decay factor can be defined as: (13) where the final optimal decay factor applied is the weighted average of individual optimal decay factors.
DATA AND RESULTS
The time series under investigation will be structured to incorporate two aspects that can affect hedge fund performance. Firstly, the data series were divided into three periods, where two of these periods incorporated a bullish phase and one incorporated a bearish phase. This approach was motivated by two previous studies. Although there is evidence that hedge funds are highly correlated with equity markets during a bearish phase (Edwards & Caglayan, 2001b) , the studies of Ennis and Sebastian (2003) and Nicholas (2004) found evidence that hedge funds will outperform other markets during a bearish phase. Secondly, the empirical study will evaluate hedge fund performance in different financial environments. To accomplish this goal the three time periods were also chosen to incorporate a pre-financial crisis period, a during financial crisis period, and a post-financial crisis period, as illustrated by Figure 1 . , which included a variety of tax cuts and spending measures that were intended to promote economic recovery. All these events had a significant effect on global financial markets, which will make it ideal to investigate the superiority of hedge funds' investment flexibility. Finally, the post-financial crisis period stretches from January 2010 to December 2011, which will help to evaluate the performance of the US and EU hedge funds during the aftermath of the financial crisis. This study examines 38 prominent EU hedge funds and 84 US hedge funds. The performance of these hedge funds was estimated using monthly returns obtained from the Eurekahedge (2012) database. In order to determine whether the US or EU hedge funds outperformed associated equity markets, monthly return data were also obtained from Yahoo Finance (2012) for CAC 40, DAX, S&P 500 and for Dow Jones. Also, the 90-day US Treasury Bill rate (constant maturity) and the Euro area bond yield were chosen as the US and EU risk-free rates, respectively. To ensure that the rankings were comparable all the ratios were calculated with both the US and EU risk-free rates for all the hedge funds and indices, respectively. The 90-day US Treasury Bill rate series was obtained from the Board of the Federal eserve System's (2012) website and the Euro area bond yield series was obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012) database, respectively.
To commence with the empirical results, it is imperative to firstly evaluate the descriptive statistics of each return series. Based on the study of Amin and Kat (2003) , some return distributions tend to be non-linear and nonnormally distributed, which will limit the performance ranking abilities of traditional performance ratios, like Jensen's alpha and the Sharpe ratio (Amin & Kat, 2003) . This is especially true, if the divergence from normality becomes more apparent when the higher moments (kurtosis and skewness) of the return distributions are taken into account (Kat, 2003) . Table  1 , it is plausible that non-normality will be present and there is a possibility of dissimilarities between performance rankings. The results in Table 1 reveal that both the EU and US hedge fund returns are leptokurtic, except for the EU hedge funds during the post-financial crisis period that illustrated a platykurtic distribution. These results justify the findings of Fung and Hsieh (1999b) , who argued that hedge fund returns are known to be leptokurtic. Also, the world indices exhibit inconsistency during all three time periods, except for the CAC 40, who display a platykurtic distribution throughout all three time periods. Furthermore, all the returns series have a negative skewness, which imply the possibility of a downside surprise (see for example McFall Lamm, 2003) , except for the US hedge funds, which have a positive skewness during the post-financial crisis period. From these findings it can be argued that most of the return series ought to possess a non-normal distribution profile, however based on the average Jarque-Bera estimates, all the hedge funds are normally distributed. This is, however, a misperception created by looking at the averages only; in reality several of the US and EU hedge funds exhibited a non-normal distribution when looking at the individual funds. During the prefinancial crisis period six EU hedge funds and 22 US hedge funds are not normally distributed, whereas 10 EU hedge funds and 30 US hedge funds are not normally distributed during the crisis period. During the post-financial crisis period, this number decreased to only one EU hedge fund and thirteen US hedge funds not being normally distributed.
The DAX exhibits a non-normal distribution during the post-financial crisis period and the S&P 500 and Dow Jones exhibit a non-normal distribution during the crisis period. The CAC 40, on the other hand, had a normal distribution throughout all three periods. Furthermore, it can be argued that although the standard deviation of all these returns is relatively low, the presence of non-normality will lead to a misperception of the actual risk present. This is due to the high kurtosis and negative skewness which will cause the variance and standard deviation to The second step of the empirical study will be to determine the level of correlation between the hedge funds, where the presence of correlation can cause the Sharpe ratio to generate bias performance rankings. This is based on Sharpe (1994) who argued that the Sharpe ratio assumes that individual securities are uncorrelated with the mean portfolio return. The results of Tables A through C in the appendix exhibit the presence of a moderate correlation level between the US and EU hedge funds. Although the overall correlation is positive, a few funds display a negative average correlation throughout the three time periods under investigation. Also, a small increase in average correlation was present among the hedge funds, although most hedge funds exhibit a decrease in average correlation during the post-financial crisis period to approximately the same level as the pre-financial crisis period. These findings reported in Tables A through C, therefore, further emphasise the possibility that the Sharpe ratio will generate bias performance rankings, due to the presence of correlation between the US and EU hedge funds. This implies that these rankings must be interpreted with extreme caution and must be benchmarked with the Omega ratio to ensure a more unbiased ranking. The results in Table 2 indicate that most EU hedge funds showed a relative constant average correlation with the different world equity markets, with an increase in this correlation over the three time periods. This illustrates a higher dependence on equities, especially with the S&P 500 and Dow Jones. Although it was to be expected that the average correlation should increase during the financial crisis period and stabilise afterwards, the results displayed a continuation in this trend.
The US and EU hedge funds also exhibit a higher level of average correlation between S&P 500 and Dow Jones during the post-financial crisis period, which may be due to a lower level of anticipated risk (volatility) in these markets. These results do, therefore, not conclusively prove that US and EU hedge funds are more correlated with equity markets during bullish or bearish phases, which contradict the results found by Edwards and Caglayan (2001b) . This implies that hedge funds may still have the ability to outperform equity markets during both a bearish and/or bullish phase, which will be established by the results found with the estimation of the different performance measures later on (see Tables 4 and 6 ). The third step of the empirical study will be to determine the level of volatility over the three different financial environment periods, which will be determined by estimating an Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) model. From Table 3 it is evident that US hedge funds exhibit the highest volatility level throughout all three time periods, based on the top 10 rankings. This implies that some US hedge funds consist of a higher level of risk compared to EU hedge funds, not only during the financial crisis period but also before and after the crisis period. These results accentuate the findings of Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), where hedge funds were associated with higher volatility levels compared to market indices. Further results also display that the volatility level increased in the equity markets as well, and continued to increase in the CAC 40 and DAX even after the financial crisis, but decreased in the S&P 500 and Dow Jones. This emphasise the results found in Table 2 , where US and EU hedge funds were more correlated with the S&P 500 and Dow Jones during the post-financial crisis period. These results, therefore, justify the fact that the S&P 500 and Dow Jones may have been associated as markets with a lesser degree of anticipated risk (volatility), making them more desirable during times where markets will exhibit extreme noise.
The fourth step of this empirical study is to determine if US or EU hedge funds were the more dominant funds over the three time periods, by means of the Sharpe, Sortino, Treynor, Jensen's alpha, Calmar and Omega ratios, respectively. In order to provide a more composite report, the following tables will report the percentage of the US and EU hedge funds that were ranked under the top 10 (best 10 performing hedge funds/equity markets). By doing so a more comprehensive conclusion can be made, regarding which hedge funds were the more dominant performers over the three periods. From the results reported in Table 4 it can be argued, based on the Sharpe, Sortino, Calmar and Omega ratio, that more US hedge funds were ranked under the top 10 best performing entities during the pre-financial crisis period. The one exception occurs where the Sharpe ratio (using the EU risk-free rate), emphasise the performance of the EU hedge funds. Even so, this dominance of the US hedge funds may be explained by the fact that US hedge funds were more volatile, based on the results from Tables 2 and 3 . These results are also corroborated by the results reported in Table 5 . It is clear that US hedge funds were able to generate a higher level of average cumulative returns during the crisis period and post-financial crisis periods. The EU hedge funds display a higher level of average cumulative returns during the pre-financial crisis period though (see Table  5 ), which is consistent with the results found by the Sharpe ratio in Table 4 .
The results are, however, inconclusive during the crisis period, where the Sharpe and Omega ratios reported that EU hedge funds were more dominant under the top 10 rankings, while the Sortino ratio indicates that the US hedge funds are dominant. Although Omega and Sortino differ in terms of the top ranked hedge funds, they still rank hedge funds over the stock market indices. These findings contradict the findings of Duong (2008) , who found that hedge funds tend to underperform equity markets when accounting for downside risk with the use of the Sortino and Omega ratios. The US and EU hedge funds also exhibit a similar performance during the crisis period based on the Calmar ratio's rankings.
The results for the post-financial crisis period are slightly different in that all the performance ratios reported that the US hedge funds were more dominant during the post-financial crisis period. This weaker performance of the EU hedge funds can partly be explained by the start of the European sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. This period saw a number of downgrades of government debt and rising government and private debt levels in some European states, therefore, decreasing investors' confidence in EU investments.
When assessing the overall picture it is evident that several US and EU hedge funds were able to outperform the equity markets during all three time periods. This was confirmed by all the performance measures. However, not all the measures placed the same funds in the same positions, a fact that can greatly be ascribed to the presence of non-normality in the return distributions. That is why the traditional performance measures, like the Sharpe ratio, should be benchmarked with the Omega ratio to overcome its shortcomings. Overall, these results contradict the results found by Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999). The results does, however, corroborate the results of Edwards and Caglayan (2001a) , who reported that hedge funds tend to outperform equity markets in terms of traditional performance ratios, like the Sharpe ratio.
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The Clute Institute Note that the upper part of the table of each performance measure provides a summary of how many of the 84 US hedge funds, the 38 EU hedge funds, and 4 world indices (a total of 126) ranked under the top 10 best performing entities. The bottom part of each performance measure illustrates the rankings of the different equity indices from a total of 126, respectively. Source: Compiled by authors. In order to check the robustness of the results, in terms of the presence of outperformance, the Sortino ratio was estimated with the CAC 40 and DAX as target rates, respectively. This approach was also followed in the estimation of the Treynor ratio and the Jensen's alpha, where all four equity markets were used as the market portfolio, respectively. The results from Table 6 emphasise that several US and EU hedge funds were able to outperform the equity markets during all three time periods. Based on the results of the Sortino ratio, EU hedge funds were able to outperform the CAC 40 and the DAX more frequently than US hedge funds could during the prefinancial crisis period. Several EU hedge funds also outperformed the DAX during the crisis period. These results were also confirmed by Jensen's alpha, reporting that EU hedge funds outperformed the CAC 40 more often than the US hedge funds during the pre-financial crisis period and outperformed the DAX more often than the US hedge funds during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. However, Jensen's alpha also reported similar performance for both US and EU hedge funds, where they exhibit similar performance in outperforming the S&P 500 during the crisis and post-financial crisis periods. Evidence from Table 6 further shows that EU hedge funds were able to outperform the Dow Jones more often than US hedge funds during the crisis and post-financial crisis periods.
From the remaining results reported by the Sortino ratio and Jensen's alpha, it is confirmed that US hedge funds were able to outperform the CAC 40 and the DAX more often than EU hedge funds. These findings were further stressed by the results of the Treynor ratio, where the US hedge funds exhibit greater incidence of outperforming all the equity markets during all three time periods than EU hedge funds did. From these results it is conclusive that although US hedge funds exhibited a higher level of volatility throughout the three time periods, they were also more likely to illustrate greater overall performance than EU hedge funds and equity markets. The results from Table 6 also illustrates that hedge funds were able to outperform their associated equity markets during both a bearish and bullish phase. The results from this study, therefore, emphasise the ability of hedge funds to use its investment flexibility during different financial environments to outperform equity markets, thus making hedge funds the more superior investment vehicle.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conflicting evidence regarding the performance of hedge funds and their persistence in outperforming other markets have been debated by a number of previous studies. Generally, it is assumed that due to the flexibility of hedge funds, in being able to apply different investment strategies, will make them the more considered unconventional asset choice. However, previous research seems to suggest that hedge funds tend to be correlated with equity markets, implying the possibility of hedge funds underperforming during bearish phases. The relatively high attrition rate among hedge funds coupled with their non-normally distributed returns (exhibiting high kurtosis and negative skewness), makes it also difficult to provide a detailed performance evaluation of all the hedge funds.
Since non-normal distributions were also present in this study, all risk-adjusted performance results were benchmarked to the Omega ratio, in an attempt to overcome most of the shortcomings of traditional performance measures. From the results if was evident that several US and EU hedge funds were able to outperform the CAC 40, the DAX, the S&P 500, and the Dow Jones during both a bearish and bullish phase. Also, although the US hedge funds illustrated greater volatility compared to EU hedged funds, evidence from the risk-adjusted performance measures supported the overall dominance of US hedge funds. These findings further emphasised that a normal buyand-hold strategy on the four world equity indices under investigation, would have been overshadowed by the performance of the US and EU hedge funds despite a higher correlation between the hedge funds and the Dow Jones and S&P 500 after the financial crisis period.
These results pose a number of further questions. The first is whether different data frequencies will render different results. It would also be interesting to look at the level of cost and resource allocation efficiency of hedge funds when compared to other investment vehicles. Further research is also required on US and EU hedge funds' ability to time the market. It would also be interesting to draw a risk-weighted returns comparison between these hedge funds and mutual funds, since mutual funds are often viewed as 'safe' investment vehicles. The Clute Institute 
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